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ABSTRACT
The article addresses the participatory budgeting (PB), which is one of 
the most recognised governance innovations of recent decades. This glo-
bal phenomenon represents in practice a shift towards participatory and 
collaborative management of public resources at the local level. The pur-
pose of this article is to determine when top down approach to PB might 
be welcomed, taking into account the characteristics of PB schemes all 
around the world that they emerged as local initiatives, instigated either 
by civil society groups or local governments. The analysis is based on the 
description of the PB example as introduced via country-wide legislation, 
exhaustively regulating PB procedure. The article examines Polish expe-
rience in the field of functioning top down approach to PB. It demon-
strates that top down PB can effectively work, if it is accompanied with 
significant incentives and grants, as well as the extensive autonomy and 
flexibility of local communities. Polish experience suggests that such an 
initiative might be relatively successful, yet there is a number of conditi-
ons that has to be met in order to ensure the dissemination of legislative 
model of participatory budgeting. The results have practical implications 
to central government institutions that consider introduction of some 
legislative framework for participatory budgeting at the local level. The 
originality of the research is in the analysis of one of successful stories 
of the PB introduced via country-wide legislation, and determining when 
this approach can work, also in other countries
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1 Introduction
Participatory budgeting (PB) is an umbrella term for wide array of governance 
experiments characterized by greater and more direct involvement of citizens 
in budgets formulation, setting spending priorities, expenditure monitoring 
and evaluation (Allegretti and Herzberg, 2004; Cabannes, 2004; Wampler, 
2007). Numerous technical and institutional arrangements could be applied 
in PB processes, including public hearings, citizen surveys, advisory boards, fo-
rums, workshops, voting (budget referenda), citizen panels and focus groups 
(Zhang and Liao, 2011; Kim and Schachter, 2013).
Since Porto Alegre experiment in late 80s’ PB became a global phenomenon 
in local governance and one of the most tangible signs of shift „from local 
government to local governance” and expansion of participatory govern-
ance, co-governance or collaborative governance (Bevir, 2012; Hordijk, 2012; 
Donaghy, 2013). It develops in polycentric manner (Dias 2014), yet we could 
distinguish some common denominator for most of its forms - PBs are lo-
cal initiatives launched and elaborated by local governments, grass-roots ac-
tivists and civil society groups. Only few countries (Peru, Bolivia, Dominican 
Republic) introduced top down PB, i.e. PB imposed by national legislation as 
mandatory arrangement for local governments (McNulty, 2004). Only Peru-
vian experience has been evaluated by Mc Nulty (2004) who provided rather 
mixed picture regarding the outcomes of this approach.
The article presents Polish experience connected with the introduction of top-
down PB and the functioning of this mechanism, which is the community fund. 
This is to determine if the example of a community fund is a successful story, 
and if so, what data is the basis for the claim. In addition, the aim of the re-
search is to determine the recommendation to be used in this approach to PB.
2 Methods
This article aims at general assessment of the top down PB introduced by 
national legislation in Poland, known as community fund for rural areas. Key 
element of this model is empowering the residents of rural areas (villages) 
to directly and conclusively decide on distribution of the part of communal 
budget, calculated according to national legislation and according to the pro-
cedure specified in this law.
The effectiveness of PB depends on various factors, which in the literature 
of the subject are divided into the governmental environment, the design of 
the process, the mechanisms used for elicit participation (Memeti and Kreci, 
2016). In this article, the community fund’s legal regulations will be analyzed 
in terms of factors that contribute to the development of PB, such as the 
governmental environment, the design of the process, the mechanisms used 
for elicit participation.
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The first step in the evaluation of the PB is to determine whether it is an instru-
ment that is willingly used by citizens and public authorities, especially in case 
of top down PB. Introduction of community fund requires autonomous of each 
communal council, yet national legislation provides some financial incentives 
for that. Review of this arrangement is conducted with the use of statistical 
data regarding primarily the share of communal councils that introduced com-
munity fund and the total expenditure distributed according to this mechanism. 
Those quantitative indicators are complemented with literature review provid-
ing broader context of the reception of top down approach to PB in Poland.
3 Results
3.1 Global expansion of participatory budgeting
The idea of PB originated in Porto Alegre in late 80s’, where advanced model 
of participation in budgetary process has been developed by the local govern-
ment and over years became a global reference model (Ganuza and Baioc-
chi, 2014). Recommendations made by citizens in PB process are not formally 
binding, but there is strong pressure to include them, without modifications, 
into budgets adopted by appropriate local government bodies (Souza, 2001; 
Novy and Leubolt, 2005). Porto Alegre model offers direct and meaningful 
participation, yet PB covers also arrangements where local authorities save 
unrestricted and exclusive decision-making powers and citizens are only con-
sulted (Sintomer, Herzberg and Röcke, 2008).
All models aim at enabling citizens to influence the allocation of public re-
sources and educating them, enhancing transparency and accountability 
(Shah, 2007). However, the evaluation of efficiency and effectiveness of pub-
lic resources allocation via PB is extremely difficult. One reason is lack of uni-
formed and homogenous model of PB. Another challenge is lack of agreement 
on the set of indicators for measuring success of PB. Outcomes and impacts 
of PB are reviewed most extensively in case of Porto Alegre, where PB is as-
sociated with improving access to public services for disadvantaged groups 
and reducing corruption in local government (World Bank, 2003; Baiocchi and 
Lerner, 2007; Cabannes, 2004; Sintomer Herzberg and Röcke, 2008).
PB is not by definition reserved only to local (municipal) budgets. However, 
both theoretical discourse and the practice of PB implementation focus on 
local government, including cities of all sizes, from small communes (below 
20,000 inhabitants) to mega-cities (Cabannes, 2004). There are only few ex-
amples from higher level of government considered in the literature, includ-
ing the state of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil (Goldfrank and Schneider, 2006) 
or in the provinces of Chucampas, Celendín or Moropon Chulucanas, Peru 
(Cabannes, 2004).
Participatory budgeting is now global phenomenon, yet the scale of its diffu-
sion is difficult to estimate. Sintomer et al. roughly calculated that there were 
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between 1,269 and 2,778 participatory budgets in 2013 (Sintomer, Herzberg 
and Röcke, 2014). However, those estimations needs to be considered with 
special reservations, not only because of huge variety of models interpreted 
as PB. As PB emerges usually as local initiative, country-wide statistics are not 
always available.
3.2 Participatory budgeting in Poland. Between bottom up and 
top down approach
Participatory budgeting arrived to Poland only few years ago, yet it evolved rap-
idly into one of the most popular innovations in local governance. It has devel-
oped in two, parallel forms: 1) as bottom-up initiative promoted by civil society 
groups that managed to disseminate this concept among local authorities; and 
2) as uniform, country-wide model established by national legislation. In 2018, 
from the new term of local self-government, come in force new legislation of 
PB in municipalities. PB will be mandatory in large local government units.
The former model is applied primarily in urban communes that are not allowed 
to apply the legislative arrangement („urban PB”). Urban PB until 2018 was not 
regulated in the national legislation at all and all procedures are established 
by local councils and mayors. National legislation does not require any public 
participation in planning public spending, both in a one-year perspective (an-
nual budgets) and long-term planning (multi-year financial prognosis). Despite 
lack of uniform model, urban PB in vast majority of the Polish municipalities is 
implemented in very similar version, characterized by citizens’ engagement re-
stricted to a very minor part of local budget (less then 2% of planned expendi-
ture), poor range of deliberation tools for engaging citizens in a dialogue on 
local budget, and procedure resembling local referendum (Sześciło, 2015). Ur-
ban PB is distributed via popular vote on the projects previously submitted by 
individual residents or civil society organizations. Vote is not formally binding 
to local council, yet it is usually reflected in the councils’ decisions. This form of 
PB has been already implemented in over 80 municipalities (Kębłowski, 2014), 
while in 2011 there was only city (Sopot) experimenting with this method 
(Kębłowski, 2013). One of the Polish non-governmental organizations gath-
ered in 2018 data on examples of 186 PB in Polish municipalities (Pracownia 
Badań i Innowacji Społecznych “Stocznia” 2018).
The provisions of the Act of 11 January 2018 on amending certain laws to 
increase the participation of citizens in the process of selecting, operating 
and controlling certain public bodies, introduced the concept of a PB at every 
level of self-government units. These provisions will come into force in the 
autumn of 2018, when the next, 5-year term of the local self-government au-
thorities will start. The PB instrument has been included in the existing provi-
sions regarding public consultations.
According to the new regulations, a PB is understood as a special form of 
public consultations, deciding on a part of budget expenditures in direct vot-
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ing. In the case of large local self-government units the obligation to separate 
the PB was introduced. PBs established in large cities in accordance with this 
obligation can not be less than 0.5% of the commune’s expenditure included 
in the last report on the implementation of the budget.
The tasks of the council of the local government unit include defining, in the 
resolution, the requirements that the proposals for the PB should meet. This 
applies in particular: formal requirements that the submitted projects should 
respond to, the required number of signatures of residents supporting the 
project, rules for the assessment of submitted projects as to their compliance 
with the law, technical feasibility, formal requirements they meet and the pro-
cedure of appeal against the decision not to allow the proposal for voting, the 
rules governing the voting, determining the results and making them public.
Top down, legislative model of PB in the form of community fund has been 
adopted in February 2009 with the effect to local budgets for 2010. Law on the 
Community Fund1 has limited scope of application. Community funds might be 
introduced only in rural or urban-rural communes2 that created special auxil-
iary units for rural areas, called communities or villages (sołectwa). Communi-
ties does not enjoy any formal autonomy from communal authorities and do 
not have their own budgets and functions to be performed independently. 
They have no capacity to get into contractual relations. Decision on establish-
ment of communities and specifying scope of their tasks is under exclusive 
competence of communal council. Typical functions delegated to communi-
ties includes organization of cultural or sports events, local roads improve-
ment or flood protection. Traditionally, the elected representatives of com-
munities supported communal administration in collecting local taxes (Kulesza 
and Sześciło, 2012). Currently, there are over 40,000 of communities in 2173 
rural and urban-rural communes (Central Statistical Office of Poland, 2015).
Communities are managed according to the bylaws adopted by communal 
councils, yet the national legislation established community gathering of 
all residents as decision-making body for community and community mayor 
(sołtys) as executive organ appointed by the gathering. Hence, communities 
might be perceived as a form of traditional direct democracy. It is feasible 
thanks to the size and population of communities that predominantly cover 
single village area.
Taking into account the formal status of community, community fund cannot 
be regarded as separate budget of this unit (Paczocha, 2009; Augustyniak, 
2010). Extracting community fund from the communal budget is not manda-
tory. However, if the communal council once decided on establishing the fund 
for a given year, this decision remains valid also for subsequent years, until it 
1 Law of 20 February 2009 on the Community Fund, Journal of Laws, No. 52, pos. 420. This 
law has been replaced by the Law of the Community Fund, Journal of Laws, pos. 301 that 
entered into force on 20 March 2014.
2 Rural communes covers only rural areas (villages), while urban-rural communes consists 
of town and surrounding rural areas (villages).
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is repealed by special resolution of the council. On the other hand, the resolu-
tion on the non-separation of the community fund may cover only one year. 
This means that in the next year local authorities will have to reconsider the 
creation of the community fund. This contributes to greater stability of this 
arrangement and minimizes the risk of its abandoning.
If the community was created, it must be implemented in accordance with 
the standards and procedures specified in the Law on the Community Fund. 
First of all, the minimal amount of the fund needs to be calculated according 
to statutory formula. This amount might be increased by the communal coun-
cil. This formula takes into account two variables relating to population and 
income capacity of the commune: 1) number of residents of each community; 
and 2) communal budget income per capita.
Although community fund is covered entirely from communal budget, the 
Law on the Community Fund contains partial refund scheme addressed to 
the communes. They are entitled to receive from the state budget reimburse-
ment of up to 40% of their expenditure on the community fund. The highest 
refund might be granted to the communes with the budget income per capita 
below the national average. This mechanism plays crucial role in incentivizing 
communes to introduction of the community fund.
The decision-making process on distribution of already calculated amount of 
community fund is set out in the Law on the Community Fund. It includes four 
main stages described below.
Figure 1. Management of the community fund
APPLICATION
• Community gathering, open to all residents of the community, 
adopts the list of the projects to be implemented within the com-
munity fund. The projects need to be compatible with the scope of 
communal tasks and contribute to improving the quality of life of 
residents
• The application should describe each project, explain their ration-
ale and estimate their costs. Estimation of total costs of all projects 
cannot exceed the amount established by the communal council as 
community fund for a given community
• Full list of projects adopted by the community gathering is submit-
ted to the mayor of the commune
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REVIEW
• The mayor may reject the application solely on formal grounds, e.g. 
incomplete or adopted with procedural errors
• In case of rejection, the community mayor may uphold the resolu-
tion of the gathering and submit it directly to the communal council
• Alternatively, the community gathering may rectify its resolution 
and resubmit it to the mayor
DECISION
• The mayor includes the projects submitted by the communities into 
communal budget proposal
• Communal council, while considering budgetary proposal, has to 
accept the communities' application
• The application might be rejected by the communal council only in 
case of incompatibility with the local development strategy, does 
not fit into catalogue of communal tasks or does not contribute to 
improving the quality of life of the residents
IMPLEMENTATION
• The projects are implemented as typical communal initiatives (in-
vestments), i.e. by the communal administrative apparatus. No 
funds are transferred directly to the community and community 
representatives does not have direct competences in the process 
of projects' implementation
• There are no legislative guarantees of community's participation in 
projects' implementation or evaluation
• However, during the budgetary year the community gathering may 
apply for modifications and alterations of the list of projects or de-
tailed content of each project
Source: based on 2014 Law on the Community Fund.
In practice, the community funds are allocated primarily to the investments 
in local transport and communication infrastructure (36% of total allocation 
in 2014), culture, e.g. running community cultural centers (25,7% in 2014) 
and maintenance of public utilities (13,9% in 2014), including parks, streets, 
squares and green areas (Council of Ministries of the Republic of Poland, 
2015). For comparison, in 2017 expenditures made under the community 
fund were mainly related to transport and communication (32.6%, and espe-
cially to municipal roads), culture and protection of national heritage (24.6% 
and especially for houses and cultural centers), municipal economy and en-
vironmental protection (17.2%, and in this mainly for lighting of streets, 
squares and roads, and maintenance of greenery), or finally physical culture 
(9.6%, and mainly on sports facilities; Council of Ministries of the Republic of 
Poland, 2018).
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4 Discussion
Introducing PB as top down initiative, driven by national legislation was a risky 
endeavor, taking into account the dominant approach to PB as locally, bot-
tom up instigated governance innovation. The main question is, therefore, if 
the local communities approved and absorbed this uniform and regulated in 
detail scheme. Considering the key elements of the model set by the Law on 
the Community Fund, the following indicators might be used in order to as-
sess the reception of the community fund at the local level:
– The number (share) of communes that adopted the community fund;
– The total expenditure on the community fund that was realized (not only 
planned).
Data for this research has been provided by the Ministry of Public Administra-
tion, Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland, Central Statistical Office 
of Poland, National Community Mayors’ Association and Watchdog Polska 
(non-governmental organization monitoring the implementation of commu-
nity funds across the country).
The number (share) of communes that - via resolutions of communal councils 
- decided to introduce community fund is the main indicator of the reception 
of this mechanism among local communities. As the decision in this matter is 
absolutely voluntary, this indicator explicitly reflects the level of acceptance 
and legitimacy of top down PB in the form of community fund. The figure be-
low illustrates the dissemination of community fund among rural and urban 
rural communes since the introduction of this mechanism in the local budgets 
for 2010.
Figure 2. The number of communes that introduced the community fund (total 
number of rural and urban-rural communes: 2173)
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Source: Ministry of the Interior and Administration 2018, <http://administracja.mswia.
gov.pl/adm/fundusz-solecki/statystyka/10370,Fundusz-solecki-w-liczbach.html>.
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Broad dissemination the community fund over the years is evident. In 2015 it 
functioned in 64% of the communes, and in 2017 - 71,31%. Rapid expansion 
of this instrument occurred in 2014 when the new Law on the Community 
Fund entered into force, providing some technical arrangements facilitating 
implementation and management of the funds3. Six years’ experience is long 
enough to conclude that the community fund gained stable and noticeable 
position in the local landscape of Poland. In terms of number (share) of com-
munes that implemented PB, community fund appeared to be much more 
popular than urban PB adopted according to rules and procedures set out 
entirely by local government. Community fund was not rejected as a formula 
contradictory to the idea of local governments’ autonomy and inconsistent 
with the global trends in PB’s development. Top down, essentially bureau-
cratic approach has been approved the majority of the local government and 
the level of acceptance remained high over the years.
Figure 3. Share of communes in which the community fund was established, 
to the number of all communes in which there are auxiliary units for rural 
areas (sołectwa)
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Source: Reply of the deputy Minister of the Interior and Administration to 
interpellation No. 24306 on the scope of dissemination of the community fund.
What is more, the total share of community fund in the budgets of rural and 
urban-rural communes increases faster than the number of communes using 
this mechanism (figure 3). While the number of communes applying commu-
nity fund increased by 4% between 2010 and 2014, the share of budgets al-
located to the community fund grew by 53% in case of rural communes and 
3 For instance, the available refund from central budget was increased and joint applica-
tions from more communities were allowed.
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by 52% in case of urban-rural communes. This means that increasing number 
of communes decided to set allocations for community funds above statutory 
minimum. However, there are no comprehensive statistics on the share of 
communes, where the extra allocation has been provided.
Figure 4. Share of budgets of rural and urban-rural communes allocated 
to the community fund
0,30%
0,37%
0,44%
0,46% 0,46%
0,60% 0,60%
0,50%
0,23%
0,29%
0,31%
0,34% 0,35%
0,40% 0,40% 0,40%
0,00%
0,10%
0,20%
0,30%
0,40%
0,50%
0,60%
0,70%
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Rural communes Urban-rural communes
Source: Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 
Central Statistical Office of Poland, 2014.
This effect cannot be linked only with the financial incentive for communi-
ty fund’s implementation. Firstly, the refund scheme activates ex post. This 
means for the municipality that the refund will take place in the next budget 
year in relation to the year in which the expenditure was made.. Furthermore, 
the amount of available refund is strictly limited, as mentioned above. What 
are the other factors that contributed to high reception of the community 
fund among local governments? First of all, it is crucial to take into account 
the historical context. Law on the Community Fund did not introduce com-
pletely new instrument, yet institutionalize and developed the mechanism 
that has been already applied in some communes. It needs to be reminded, 
the Communal Government Act contained (and still contains) provisions ena-
bling local governments to empower communities to manage specified share 
in communal budget (Trykozko, 2014). Detailed procedures for setting this 
share and disposing it should be established in the commune’s bylaws. Tradi-
tionally, one of the most popular instruments adopted locally were so called 
“community deductions” - mechanism very similar to the community fund, i.e. 
based on authorizing the community to dispose the share of local budget cal-
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culated primarily with reference to community population. Sobiesiak-Penszko 
(2012) claim that the community fund has been introduced most extensively 
in the regions where the practice of community deductions or other similar 
instruments was most disseminated.
It is clear, therefore, why the Law on the Community Fund has been contest-
ed by the Polish Association of Rural Governments as limiting the communal 
autonomy (Swianiewcz, 2011). The introduction of uniform legislative model 
interfered with well established and developed locally practices. On the other 
hand, this law secures wide scope of autonomy for communal councils in de-
termining key elements of community funds on their territory. What is es-
sential, the communal councils are allowed not to introduce community fund 
in the formula imposed by the legislation and may continue to use their own 
scheme. Obviously, financial incentives made the legislative model of com-
munity fund more attractive, yet regulatory approach reflected in the Law on 
the Community Fund is relatively flexible and general. It focuses on setting 
minimum standards and protecting communities against arbitrary decisions 
of the communal councils or mayors. Communal councils are still authorized 
to make final decision on the allocation of funds to the communities and un-
der circumstances that are broadly defined (see: figure 1) it may reject the 
community’s proposal. The mayor has supervisory powers over the activities 
of community bodies and is entirely responsible for implementation of the 
projects selected by the communities.
Hence the communal autonomy is not undermined by the Law on the Com-
munity Fund. The major drawback of this law is rather lack of sufficient guar-
antees for empowerment of communities, primarily in the phase of projects 
implementation. The role of the communities ends up when the list of pro-
jects is submitted to the communal authorities. They are not provided with 
any rights to participate in the final decision-making and or realization of 
the projects. The same disadvantages have also introduced in 2018 PB and 
mentioned above regulation of PB, based on the mechanism of public con-
sultations. As they do not enjoy judicial capacity, they cannot challenge in the 
administrative courts any decisions and actions undertaken by the commune 
with regard to the community fund. They need to rely on, in this matter, cen-
tral government’s bodies performing supervision over local governments. 
Therefore, introduction of the community fund might be perceived as an im-
portant, yet cautious step towards communities’ empowerment.
As previously mentioned, in 2018, from the new term of local self-govern-
ment, come in force in Poland new legislation of PB in municipalities. PB will 
be mandatory in large local government units. These regulations are ques-
tionable, because the legislator did not react to raised doubts about the or-
ganization of the former PB in the construction of public consultations (con-
sultations do not constitute a decision). In addition, the adopted regulations 
do not correspond to new trends, in which votes are changed to discuss the 
best solutions in small groups (this is also characteristic for community fund). 
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Next years will show the functioning of this type of top down PB, presented 
different approach than in the case of community fund.
5 Conclusion
The case of Polish community fund proves that participatory budgeting might 
be effectively introduced via national legislation, yet specific conditions needs 
to be met in order to ensure acceptance of this approach among local com-
munities. Firstly, the final decision on applying the legislative model of PB 
should be reserved to the competence of local governments. Autonomy of 
local governments needs to be combined with stimulants and incentives en-
couraging communities to follow the model set out in the legislation, primar-
ily incentives of financial nature. What is also crucial, is to limit the legislative 
framework to setting minimum standards for the PB’s procedure and leaving 
enough room for local governments to control detailed elements of the pro-
cess. Finally, the historical context also matters. Success of the community 
fund was enhanced by the past experience with similar arrangements initi-
ated and applied at local level. Law on the Community Fund institutionalized 
and disseminated those practices. 
Important reservations need to be made to the general claim of the success 
of the community fund. Although the community fund became significant el-
ement of local governance and got absorbed „internalized” by the communi-
ties, more in-depth analysis is required in order to assess its impact on the 
quality of life and public services in rural areas or efficiency of the allocation 
of public resources via this mechanism.
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